Please reach me at RaisedInDigital@protonmail.com if you cannot find an answer to your question.
If this is for a Business, Church or School I would say Absolutely Yes.
Fortinet make a very good Appliance that can keep you safe from known malicious sites, And you can manage users online time, site content Etc. Fortinet has continued to surface to the top as highly recommended and reasonably priced. When I have contacted them they put me in contact with someone to work with me and answer my questions even prior to any purchase. This individual recommended I buy a used appliance from eBay to play with.
I have contacted Arista (The makers of the Untangled Next Gen Firewall) and they would not provide me even basic information without proof of purchase or account information. This was tremendously disappointing and I will not be recommending their services based on this interaction.
Your Windows, Mac, and other appliances have built-int Firewalls that block ports, so an appliance that does the same thing is mostly a waste of money.
Any appliance that does more than just blocking ports will have a licensing fee as they have to maintain the current known sites, maintain the virus definitions and should allow you to see metrics of use.
1. Don't allow connected electronics in the rooms with closed doors.
2. If you have a main Computer for the family put it in a common area so everything is seen by everyone.
3. I do have an office (sort of) but I keep my door open
4. If time for testing or recording is necessary a time frame should be established before the door gets closed.
Apple’s iOS has long cultivated a strong reputation for security and privacy. Its tightly controlled ecosystem, strict App Store review process, consistent software updates, and polished user experience lead many people to feel inherently protected. However, this sense of security can create a dangerous complacency, causing users to lower their guard in ways that actually increase risk.
While iOS offers meaningful technical protections, the perception of safety often leads to riskier behavior — particularly around phishing, scams, and weak personal security habits.
Why the “Feel of Security” Backfires
Apple’s design and marketing reinforce the idea that its devices are inherently safe:
• Clean interfaces and familiar system prompts build instinctive trust.
• Features like App Tracking Transparency and on-device processing create the impression of strong privacy protection.
As a result, many users assume their device will protect them, which often leads to reduced vigilance. Common signs of this complacency include:
• Lower use of additional security tools such as VPNs or password managers.
• Greater willingness to engage with unknown websites or sellers.
• Reuse of weak or repeated passwords under the assumption that “the phone is secure.”
Evidence from Recent Studies
Multiple independent reports, including research from cybersecurity firms such as Malwarebytes, highlight this gap between perception and reality:
• Riskier habits: iPhone users are more likely than Android users to purchase from untrusted sources (47% vs 40%) and engage with shady sellers.
• Lower protective measures: Only 21% of iOS users install dedicated security software, compared to 29% of Android users. They’re also less likely to use unique passwords.
• Higher victimization rates: 53% of iPhone users report falling victim to a scam, versus 48% of Android users.
• Phishing surge: iOS devices are increasingly being targeted by phishing attacks, as attackers focus on users who may be more trusting of their platform’s security.
These findings suggest that the strong reputation of iOS can sometimes reduce the sense of personal responsibility for security.
Developer Perspective: App Vetting Differences
From a developer’s point of view, the two platforms take very different approaches to quality control. Google Play requires new personal developer accounts to complete a closed testing phase with at least 12 opted-in testers for a minimum of 14 days before an app can be released to production. This creates a real-world validation step that helps catch issues early.
Apple’s App Store review process, by contrast, relies on manual human review against detailed guidelines. While thorough, it does not include a mandatory external testing requirement. This difference contributes to the perception that iOS is more carefully curated, even if the actual security outcomes depend heavily on user behavior.
Android’s Strength: Granular Control and Micro-Management
One area where Android currently offers a clear advantage is user control over apps and permissions.
Android provides several powerful tools for managing security at a detailed level:
• A Privacy Dashboard that shows exactly when apps accessed sensitive data such as the camera, microphone, or location.
• One-time and temporary permissions, allowing users to grant access only for a specific task.
• Strong background restrictions and app hibernation features.
• Work Profile and Private Space, which let users create separate, encrypted environments for sensitive or work-related apps.
• Improving AI-powered threat detection that monitors apps for suspicious behavior in real time.
These features give technically inclined users significantly more ability to customize and harden their device’s security posture than iOS currently allows.
However, Android’s flexibility comes with trade-offs. Security experiences can vary significantly depending on the manufacturer. Flagship devices from Google and Samsung generally receive faster and longer security updates, while many budget and mid-range Android phones receive slower patches. Additionally, the ability to sideload apps increases risk if users are not careful about where they install software from.
In practice, Android rewards users who actively manage their device, while iOS generally provides stronger protection for those who prefer a simpler, more hands-off experience.
iOS Control Improvements
Apple has also improved user controls in recent years, introducing features such as precise location sharing, one-time permissions, and Lockdown Mode. While these enhancements have narrowed the gap in some areas, Android generally remains ahead in transparency and the depth of user-configurable controls.
The Technical Reality vs. Perception
Both platforms have strengths and limitations. iOS benefits from tighter integration between hardware and software and a more consistent update experience across supported devices. Android offers greater flexibility and transparency for users who want to manage their own security.
Importantly, both platforms still allow significant first-party tracking within their own ecosystems and apps. The well-known phenomenon of seeing targeted ads after conversations or searches is usually not caused by secret microphone spying, but rather by behavioral profiling, contextual signals, and first-party data collection — mechanisms that exist on both iOS and Android.
The core issue remains the same: strong platform security can create a false sense of invulnerability, leading users to become less careful in their daily habits.
Lessons and Best Practices
No smartphone is completely secure on its own. The most effective approach combines platform strengths with good user habits.
Recommendations:
• Regularly review app permissions on whichever platform you use.
• Use strong, unique passwords managed by a reputable password manager.
• Enable two-factor authentication everywhere possible.
• Be cautious with links, downloads, and unsolicited messages — regardless of your device.
• Keep your operating system and apps updated.
• Consider using a VPN when on public networks or handling sensitive information.
For organizations using bring-your-own-device (BYOD) policies, it is important to implement security controls that account for both platform differences and individual user behavior, rather than assuming one operating system is inherently safe.
Final thought: Security is not something you can simply buy by choosing one brand of phone over another. It is an ongoing practice. The device that feels the most secure is not always the one that keeps you safest — especially when that feeling leads to complacency.
As a parent you are responsible for what your child does. there are several cases where parents ended up in jail or prison for their child actions.
You need to know who your children are interacting with and how appropriate those interactions are so you can guide them into appropriate behavior as an adult.
I know parent of teen parents that have told me that if they only had monitored their child online activity they may have been able to prevent what happened.
Yes there are good options
⚠️ Remember to donate to these programs if you like them, this is the best way to ensure long lasting alternatives.
LibreOffice is my preferred choice.
https://www.libreoffice.org/
Another option is OpenOffice
https://www.openoffice.org/
There have been studies that show that when people have to change their passwords frequently they become less secure.
A password should be a MINIMUM of 12 characters which then becomes a Pass-Phrase.
I recommend having a set of passwords that you re-use, Yes I know that we are told to never re-use a password but hear me out. When you set up a password for example Th3^Gr@55^15^Gr33n
Length ✅
Complexity ✅
You can remember it ✅
Where this would be compromised would be when the account host is Hacked or you respond to a malicious email where you give them it yourself.
Having a couple variations of the Pass Phrase will allow you to remember it and have
1 for medical sites
1 for a bank account
1 for online shopping.
1 for Etc. . .
If you hear of the company being compromised you can alter it by changing the phrase and then update the rest as you go.
With this methodology you will even be more likely to guess what you password was before you forgot it.
The instinct is understandable. The browser is now the workplace. Most business applications live in it. Phishing, malicious scripts, stolen cookies, and drive-by exploits arrive through it. When an executive hears that “browser activity is one of the greatest corporate vulnerabilities,” the next thought is often: reduce the number of browsers. Pick Chrome or Edge. Ban everything else. Less variety, less risk.
That is a management instinct, not a security one.
Reducing tool diversity is not the same as reducing attack surface. Forcing a workforce onto Chromium-based browsers increases correlated risk. A single shared engine becomes a single shared failure mode.
Chrome, Edge, Brave, Opera, Vivaldi, and most other “alternatives” all run Google’s Blink engine. On desktop, Chrome and Edge alone account for the large majority of usage. Across the web, Chromium-based browsers render roughly three-quarters of traffic. Firefox’s Gecko engine is the only remaining independent, cross-platform engine with meaningful enterprise reach.
That matters because vulnerabilities live in engines, not brand names.
When a critical Chromium flaw is disclosed — or worse, exploited as a zero-day — it does not stop at Chrome. It applies to Edge and the rest of the Blink family at the same time. Google patched its fifth Chrome zero-day of 2026 by June. In 2025, researchers counted eight Chrome zero-days exploited in the wild and estimated Chromium users spent about 87 days of the year exposed to at least one in-the-wild exploit. A separate crash-class Blink flaw took down Chrome, Edge, and seven other Chromium browsers in testing. Firefox and Safari were unaffected.
That is the definition of systemic risk. A banned Firefox is not a removed attack path. It is a removed hedge.
The second mistake is treating ad blockers as a convenience feature.
A well-managed content filter at the browser is one of the few controls that can stop a malicious script, tracking pixel, or phishing kit before it reaches the endpoint. It complements secure web gateways and EDR. It does not replace them.
Google’s Manifest V3 change, now fully enforced in Chrome, sharply limits that control. The old model let an extension intercept and cancel network requests in real time from large, frequently updated filter lists. The new model caps declarative rules (on the order of 30,000, versus the 80,000–300,000 rules a serious blocker actually uses) and removes the dynamic blocking that made tools like uBlock Origin effective against fast-changing delivery networks. The remaining Chrome option is uBlock Origin Lite: useful, weaker, and not the same product.
Microsoft Edge is on the same path. Consumer Manifest V2 support begins phasing out in August 2026, with a goal of finishing by year-end. Enterprise deprecation is planned for early 2027.
Firefox is the exception among major browsers. Mozilla still supports the capabilities the full uBlock Origin needs, including request blocking, and has said publicly that support is not going away. IT can force-install that extension, lock it, and block everything else through Firefox enterprise policy. That is a client-side control you cannot currently match on Chrome.
Banning Firefox therefore does not “remove a risky browser.” It removes the last widely deployable place where that class of control still works at full strength.
This is not theoretical. Surveys in the last year have found that roughly four in five IT professionals reported a browser-linked incident, that about half of organizations suffered a successful browser-based attack, and that a large majority of workplace applications are now browser-only or browser-first. Phishing, malicious extensions, credential and cookie theft, and in-session attacks are the daily pattern — not a niche.
You do not fix that by making every employee share the same rendering engine, JavaScript engine, and extension platform.
A common objection is operational: two browsers means two update cadences, two policy surfaces, two help-desk scripts.
That cost is real. It is also solvable, and it is smaller than the cost of a fleet-wide Chromium exploit.
Firefox has an Extended Support Release channel, ADMX/GPO templates, Intune policies, and a policies.json model. Administrators can force-install approved extensions (including uBlock Origin), block all others, import enterprise certificates, lock preferences, set proxies, and disable user tinkering. Recent versions also support the same Content Analysis SDK pattern used by Chrome for DLP, which reduces the need for fragile DLL injection.
The security failure is not “people might use Firefox.” The security failure is unmanaged browsers and unmanaged extensions, of any brand.
A security-minded browser policy does not have to make Firefox the default. It should stop treating it as contraband.
Standardization is valuable when it means consistent configuration. It is dangerous when it means a single implementation of the most attacked application in the company.
The goal is not to champion a browser. The goal is to avoid building a workplace where one unpatched Blink vulnerability, or one weakened extension model, is a problem for everyone at once.
Browser activity is one of the greatest corporate vulnerabilities. The answer is defense in depth at the client — including an independent engine and the controls that still work on it. Removing those is not risk reduction. It is a quieter, more concentrated form of the same risk.
In the world of Anti-Virus the ranking is ever changing.
Windows Defender is Free, works without impacting the Operating System, and is pretty good.
If you are willing to pay I recommend BitDefender as it most consistently has the lowest rate of issues with other software, the Operating System and lower resource usage.
I typically refer to third party research which can be found using the following website:
Yes I think you should setup and email for them at an early point.
NO i do not believe they should have free access to it until the parent feels comfortable with them, and even then it should be monitored.
Why set up an email early?
With all of the devices and electronics targeted at children's learning it won't be long before they have a device that you are setting up for them. You need to have a separate account for them that you can use to manage their stuff more effectively and not accidentally allow them more access to things than they should have..